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KILL ALL THE LAWYERS?: SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL.

By

Daniel J. Kornstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994.

Pp. xvii, 274. $24.95.
On October 12, 1991, near the end of a long day of televised
hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Alan Simpson
read the following lines from Shakespeare to Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas:
·
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls,
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands.
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.1

These lines, evoking the pain of impugned reputation, seemed
to express Senator Simpson's sympathy for Thomas at a moment
when Professor Anita Hill's accusations had put Thomas's reputation under exacting scrutiny. But, as Daniel Komstein2 points out
in his new book, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal,
these words from Othello are spoken by the scheming Iago, who
slyly emphasizes the importance of reputation to Othello just
before falsely suggesting that the flirtations of Othello's wife Desdemona have put Othello's own reputation in jeopardy (p. 157).
Komstein suggests that a listener aware of this dramatic context
might see Senator Simpson as an Iago, "placing each word carefully
in the ear of Judge Thomas [not to soothe him but] to inflame his
anger against [his] accuser" (pp. 156-57).
Komstein's book explains the dramatic context surrounding
many Shakespearean lines often quoted by lawyers. In so doing,
Komstein organizes his book according to Shakespeare's "major
legal themes" (p. xvi). Each chapter begins with a brief description
of the characters and plot of a particular Shakespeare play; Komstein then explains the themes in that play one by one. As he
presents them, these themes are often independent and unrelated.
For example, Chapter Three on Measure for Measure includes sections on subjects ranging from "Law and Morality" and "Privacy"
to "Dead-Letter Statutes" and "Cruel and Unusual Punishment"
(pp. 35-64). The autoJ,lomy of these sections lends the book an encyclopedic feel. Kornstein himself acknowledges in the Prologue
1. P. 157 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Onrauo act 3, sc. 3, 11. 160-66 (Stanley Wells
& Gary Taylor eds., Oarendon Press 1988)).
2. President, Law and Humanities Institute; Founding partner, Komstein Veisz & Wexler.
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that his book seems· like the beginning to an "encyclopedia on the
subject of Shakespeare and the law" (p. xvii).
So what is this subject of Shakespeare and the law? Kornstein
does not explicitly describe this broad and ambitious project. He
admits that his book might be criticized for not elaborating "enough
about Shakespeare's life, or the law, or each play, or the theories of
how we can make the connections," and he preempts that criticism,
saying, "To that charge I plead no contest" (p. xvii). After apologizing for not focusing on these issues in his book, he never quite
explains what issues he will emphasize. Early on, he suggests a few
possible foci, dwelling in turn on the law and literature movement,
Shakespeare's life, and his own relationship to Shakespeare's work.
None of these introductory discussions, however, accurately delineates the actual approach Kornstein takes in describing the major
legal themes of Shakespeare's plays.
Kornstein first presents his book as a law and literature project.
In Chapter One, he positions himself as a proponent of the law and
literature movement, which promotes the use of law and literature
to inform each other (pp. 3-11 ). He claims that law often serves up
"the stuff of literature" and that literature clarifies our understanding of the law and "move[s] more hearts and minds" than the law
(pp. 4, 8). In describing this reciprocal relationship, Kornstein does
not explain how it relates to his. project. He insists that the connection between law and literature is "a field itself worthy of study,"
but he does not define the limits of that field (p. 9). Kornstein apparently appeals to the law and literature movement to justify his
topic and not to borrow any specific critical approach.
Second, Kornstein attempts to explain how Shakespeare knew
so much about law (pp. 11-21). This biographical digression also
fails to explain his focus. In fact, Kornstein expressly disavows the
notion that his project is "to speculate on the biography of ~e
Bard" (p. xvi). Nevertheless, relying on evidence from W. Nicholas
Knight's book Shakespeare's Hidden Life,3 he argues that certain
social and personal circumstances may have led Shakespeare to develop a particular interest in. the law. For example, Kornstein first
suggests that Shakespeare and the other playwrights of his time
may have developed legal themes in order to appeal to the law students from the Inns of Court in London who made up much of their
audience (p. 13). In support of this proposition, he points out that
during Shakespeare's career, more than a third of the plays performed in London had at least one trial scene (p. 13). In addition,
Kornstein argues that personal involvement with the courts may
have sharpened Shakespeare's interest in law (pp. 15-21). He de3. Pp. 15-20 (relying on W. NICHOLAS KNioHr,
nm LAW, 1585-1595 (1973)).
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scribes Shakespeare as "obsessed" with an ill-fated legal dispute
over his inheritance, which, in conjunction with other cases, made
him into a "walking litigation factory" (pp. 16, 19). At the end of
the book, however, he casts doubt upon the theory that Shakespeare worked as a lawyer or law clerk during the ten years of his
life about which we know nothing (pp. 228-38). In sum, the biographical discussions intimate few parallels between Shakespeare's
experiences and his plays,4 and Kornstein's subsequent discussions
of the plays rarely allude to Shakespeare's life.
Kornstein's own life presents another possible focus for his discussion. More than once Kornstein describes how he personally responded to a Shakespearean performance,5 and he explains that
"each of us approaches Shakespeare idiosyncratically" (p. xvii).
Kornstein's idiosyncratic responses pervade his discussion. The
plays stir his memory, and his recollections - legal and nonlegal pepper the text. For him, the line "Let's kill all the lawyers"6 conjures up a slew of lawyer-haters - Ambrose Bierce, debt-ridden
farmers in Shay's rebellion in 1786, and President Bush's press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, for example (pp. 23-24, 27, 33). These
legal, cultural, and historical references reveal Kornstein's political
leanings and legal activism. For example, he says that "Oliver
North ... should read Richard II" and that in A Midsummer Night's
Dream, "Shakespeare is encouraging a 'living document' approach
to interpreting the Constitution" (pp. 198, 131). Kornstein uses
such references only to illustrate and decorate his points and not to
make them. Kornstein's own life, like Shakespeare's life and the
theories of law and literature, remains peripheral to the focus of his
discussion of Shakespeare and the law.
Kornstein's commentary on the plays eventually reveals three
basic critical approaches to his subject of Shakespeare and the law.
First, Kornstein presents many political, interpretive, and ethical
themes as essentially legal in nature. Second, he compares Shakespearean characters and situations to legal characters and situations.
Third, he applies modern concepts of law to dramatic characters
and situations. These approaches,, employed independently,
achieve varying levels of success.
First, Kornstein examines the plays to identify those themes, issues, and ideas that are legal in some way. After locating a legal
element in a play, he discusses the parallel modern legal concept.
4. Komstein suggests that Shakespeare's lawsuit over his inheritance might explain his
interest in inheritance in King Lear, and that Shakespeare's appeal to equity in the lawsuit
foreshadows the courtroom battle over the contract in The Merchant of Venice (p. 17).
5. See, e.g., pp. xi, 157.
6. P. 22 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KINo HENRY nm
Socra act 4, sc. 2, I. 78 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)).
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For example, Komstein suggests that in Measure for Measure, Angelo's abrupt decision to a!fest Claudio for violating a previously
unenforced prohibition on fornication is unfair as a: matter of law
(pp. 36, 46). He then describes how modem law addresses this unfairness under the legal doctrine of desuetude (pp. 47-49).
Komstein takes an expansive approach to the identification of
"legal themes." In Julius Caesar, Komstein sees legal issues in
Brutus's Machiavellian determination that the violent means of assassinating Caesar are justified by the expedient end of advancing
the classic republican political system (pp. 113-14). Legal themes
also appear to him in A Midsummer Night's· Dream in Theseus's
comment to Hippolyta that plays are not silly "if imagination
amend them";7 to Komstein, this remark suggests activist theories
of interpretation applicable to the Constitution (pp. 129-31). In
The Winter's Tale, Paulina's outspoken criticism of Leontes, who
has unjustly accused his wife Hermione of adultery, reveals Paulina
to be "the citizen-critic of government" and thus adds a legal dimension to the play (p. 190). Komstein sees any theme involving
politics, interpretation, or ethical qualities as legal.
The more Komstein perceives dramatic elements as "legal," the
less insightful his discussion tends to be. In discussing Richard II,
Komstein describes the power vacuum created by Richard's weakness as involving "the very stuff of constitutional law" and "the nature of government itself" (p. 199). Having made this vague
connection to law, he does not seem to know what to do next. He
simply concludes that Richard II "provides some of the intellectual
background of the American Revolution" (p. 200). That offhand
observation leaves the reader with no clearer understanding of
Shakespeare or of the law.
Second, Komstein analyzes Shakespeare's characters and dramatic scenes as legal characters and dilemmas. This approach enables him to cast light on dramatic characters and situations by
evaluating them from a legal perspective. In the discussion of The
Merchant of Venice, for example, Komstein illuminates the character Portia by evaluating her performance in her roles of judge and
lawyer (pp. 68-76). He argues that Portia's reliance on a legal technicality to thwart the character Shylock impugns not only her substantive fairness as a judge but also her overall fairness as a person
(pp. 76-77). The comparison of dramatic situations with modem
legal situations makes those dramatic situations more immediate
and imaginable for modem lawyers. By describing the peace negotiations in Henry IV Part 2 as akin to a settlement conference,
Komstein prevents the reader from viewing the archbishop of
7. P. 129 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER Nxmn"s DREAM act 5, sc. 1, I.
211 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)).
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York's admonition, "A peace is in the nature of a conquest, I For
then both parties nobly are subdued, I And neither party loser"B as
merely a military maxim from a remote era (pp. 140-41). In this
way, his comparisons of dramatic contexts with more familiar legal
situations imaginatively enlist his legal perspective.
All is not well with this legal perspective, however. Komstein
often fails to situate his legal perspective within a broader analysis.
For example, he sometimes evaluates characters as if they were actually and only modem legal personae, without realizing that this
approach is reductive. His comparisons of dramatic situations to
modem legal conflicts often warp crucial aspects of the plays. For
example, when he criticizes Portia in The Merchant of Venice for
relying on a technicality instead of simply finding Shylock's contract
void as against public policy, he not only assumes that the public
policy safeguard obtained in medieval Venice, but he also assumes
away the premise that Antonio cannot escape enforcement of the
contract (p. 71). Such anachronistic relations of modem law to
Shakespeare's dramatic situations distort Komstein's critical
understanding.
Komstein unfortunately allows this modem legal perspective to
guide his critical project. His goal is to uncover Shakespeare's legal
messages for modem lawyers. Thus, he repeatedly seeks to reduce
the plays' complex themes to simple lessons for lawyers. This
message-driven focus is apparent in his discussion of Dick the
Butcher's line: "The first thing we do, I Let's kill all the lawyers" in
Henry VI Part 2.9 Komstein envisions his purpose in this second
type of analysis as divining Shakespeare's message; for instance, he
concludes fuat the "original intent behind Dick's line" remains unclear because "[i]n such equivocal circumstances, and without more
definitive biographical facts, it is impossible to say for sure what
Shakespeare himself thought about lawyers or what he personally
intended by Dick the Butcher's line" (p. 33). Komstein imputes to
Shakespeare a legal wisdom and moral authority that causes him to
perceive Shakespeare's plays as a fertile source of legal and moral
lessons for the lawyer. For example, Henry IV Part 2 becomes "a
8. Pp. 140-41 (quoting Will.IAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KINo HENRY nm
SIXTH act 4, sc. 1, II. 315-17 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)).
9. P. 22 (quoting SHAKESPEARE, supra note 6, at act 4, sc. 2, I. 78). Komstein argues that
the line has three "layers of meaning," with each layer representing a particular view of
lawyers. P. 25. First, the line, yelled by Dick the Butcher amid a crowd of commoner rebels
about to invade London in a popular revolt, might be understood as a criticism of lawyers as
defenders of the status quo. Pp. 26-28. Second, because the disruptive role of the rebels
appears in stark contrast to the stabilizing role of lawyers, the line might act as a backhanded
compliment to the legal profession. Pp. 28-32. Finally, in what Komstein declares to be "the
most penetrating, and yet previously unexplored layer of meaning," the rebels' protest of the
legal maneuvers by which the good Duke of Gloucester was tricked might amount to a criticism not of "all law, but perverted, false law." Pp. 32, 33.
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morality play about youth faced with a choice between law and vanity" (p. 139).
The lessons Komstein elicits often seem banal. For example, he
explains "[t]he lesson of Hamlet" with an allusion to Justice
Holmes, because "Holmes saw that such passion needs to be channeled" (p. 96). This approach oversimplifies the plays and ignores
their complexity. When Komstein claims that "[t]he whole theme
of Othello can be summed up in terms of reputation," he dramatically underrepresents Shakespeare's appeal (p. 162).
Komstein's penchant for reducing each play to a lesson mirrors
the manner in which lawyers reduce complex legal issues to single
questions for courts to decide. Although he concedes that "[w]hen
it comes to Shakespeare I am only an amateur," his critical approach seems not amateurish but lawyerly (pp. xiii-xiv). Some of
his lawyerly talents prove handy: he clearly parses out the facts of
each play and ably notices legal issues. Like an advocate, at many
points throughout the book he takes and argues one side of an issue. This trial-lawyer approach to the plays again makes too little
of their dramatic complexity. For example, in his analysis of The
Merchant of Venice, Komstein defines his project as deciding
whether Shylock is a "monster" or a tragic victim - which he dubs
respectively the "majority" and "minority" views - and in doing so
neglects the possibility that Shylock is both (p. 66). This intolerance
of nuance and paradox appears again when, frustrated by his inability to reduce Portia to a caricature, he exclaims, "Some feminist!
Portia almost seems like two different persons: one the clever,
forceful judge, the other a passive princess" (p. 82).
As an advocate, Komstein needs characters to champion. Accordingly, after observing that Shylock's daughter Jessica, who ran
away from her father and married out of her faith, "talks less but
rebels more" than Portia, he hurriedly concludes that she "may
claim equal or better title as feminist heroine of the play" (p. 82).
Komstein's partisanship also leads him to hyperbolic description.
Portia's condemnation of Shylock makes her "not just a minorleague bigot, but a world-class, equal opportunity hate monger" (p.
76). Contrast Komstein's description of Bottom the Weaver in A
Midsummer Night's Dream - who by Puck's magic temporarily
turns into an ass and then later imagines ·it all a dream - as not
only more self-aware, but in fact "the Jeffersonian ideal, the great
liberal hope" (p. 133). Such extreme characterizations suggest
Komstein's effectiveness as an advocate but call into question his
credibility as a literary critic. Komstein's legal approach ends up
distorting Shakespeare.
Komstein's project - understanding Shakespeare's meaning remains crucial for lawyers, as well as Senators, who seek to "use"

1826

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1820

Shakespeare. Lawyers do use Shakespeare - his plays are quoted
in judicial opinions far more often than are any other works of literature (p. 241). But why? Kornstein views Shakespeare as a legal
and moral teacher; this, however, does not fully indicate why truths
seem more true coming from Shakespeare. Rather, the authority
behind such quotations lies not in the wisdom of the Bard but in the
erudition of the quoter. Furthermore, when Kornstein argues that a
remark of the chief justice to Falstaff in Henry IV Part 2 "compresses in a verse a whole primer on advocacy," he brings to light a
more sensible use of quotation: as a source of "compressed" eloquence (p. 141). Lawyers can draw upon and learn from Shakespeare's language, in all its eloquence and concision, in their
professional pursuits.
Lawyers can use Shakespeare for more than quotation. Shakespeare's situations and characters strike us as real. They vividly illuminate human experience and human nature. 10 While
Kornstein's readings of the plays as lessons seem to confirm Judge
Richard Posner's warning that law in literature is no more than a
metaphor,11 literature's role in law need not be confined to legal
themes in order to be useful to lawyers. Whenever a lawyer needs
to appeal to actual human experience and human nature, literature
may assist him in that appeal. Kornstein's difficulty in evading the
dangers of a legal approach in his critical endeavor suggests only
that an encyclopedia of legal themes is work for Shakespearean
critics, not lawyers.
So what useful books can energetic lawyers fond of Shakespeare
write? Kornstein's third approach to connecting Shakespeare and
the law provides a clue. Under this approach, he engages not in
describing the legal meaning of the plays but in applying modern
law to the characters and situations in those plays. His assumption
that modern American legal doctrines obtain in the context of the
plays proves both dangerous and valuable. While any attempt to
use such doctrines to understand the dramatic characters and situations is anachronistic and misleading, the application of modern law
to the Shakespearean situations can show how modern American
law might resolve those situations today. For example, when Kornstein describes how an imaginary appeal of Shylock's conviction
might turn on doctrines such as due process and equal protection,
10. Komstein laments, "Classic authors do not seem to matter to modem young people."
P. 12. But because Komstein also observes that
in our teens or barely out of them, we are usually too young to understand fully or
appreciate the plays. We have not lived enough, we are too inexperienced. We bring
too little to the encounter. We can perhaps memorize a few lines and parrot the narrative, but not much beyond that, and certainly not with real understanding [p. xv]
it is hard to see why they should.
11. P. 6 (discussing RICHARD PosNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MlsUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)).
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he illustrates how differently our modem legal system affords recognition to issues of mercy, fairness, and equality (pp. 83-85).
Beyond this application of modem law to these dramatic situations, there is more that lawyers can do. Shakespeare's dramas provide paradigms of conflict, and Komstein observes at the end of his
book that "[w]e often measure, analyze, and consider legal issues
against a Shakespearean pattern" (p. 245). Komstein could perform such an analysis, but he often stops short. For example, in his
discussion of King Lear he mentions that a recent book by Jane
Smiley, A Thousand Acres, 12 reimagines Lear's situation .today as
an inheritance dispute. Komstein tells us that Smiley's characters
Larry and Caroline .(Lear and Cordelia)' lose their case and face
sanctions for suing in the first place (pp. 225-26). Komstein concludes merely that this outcome "may symbolize the law's limits"
(p. 225). He thus answers the question, "How would Lear be resolved today?" without proceeding to other questions that he has
the legal expertise to answer: "Am I happy with that modem result? If not, does that suggest a problem in modem law?" These
are questions we hope those like Komstein - with the mind of a
lawyer and a love of Shakespeare - will address.
-

12. P. 225 (discussing JANE SMILEY, A

THOUSAND ACRES

Kevin T. Traskos

{1992)).

